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Heller v. Doe: The Supreme Court Diminishes the

Rights of Individuals With Mental Retardation
I. INTRODUCTION

Involuntary commitment' of individuals with mental illness and
mental retardation occurs in every state in this country.2 Every state
except New Hampshire maintains at least one large state-run care
facility for individuals with mental retardation.3 Similarly, a network
of state-run institutions has been the most prevalent means of addressing the needs of individuals with mental illness.4 While there has
been a move toward community living arrangements for individuals
with mental retardation and mental illness, not all members of these
populations have obtained placement in alternative care programs.'
I. "Commitment" is defined as "[tihe proceedings directing confinement of a
mentally ill or incompetent person for treatment. Commitment proceedings may be
either civil or criminal; and voluntary or involuntary .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
273 (6th ed. 1990).
2. In every jurisdiction of the country, there are statutes governing the involuntary
commitment of people with mental illness and mental retardation. See Heller v. Doe,
113 S. Ct. 2637, 2646-47 (1993).
3. See Brief for Voice of the Retarded (VOR), et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Heller (1993) (No. 92-351).
4. See Ronald L. Wisor, Jr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal
Perspective on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145 (1993). In the
mid-nineteenth century, Dorothea Dix helped begin the move toward "humane care" for
persons with mental illness which included state-run hospitals specifically designed to
care for people with mental illness. BETH A. TROUL, M.D., MODELS OF COMMUNITY
SUPPORT SERVICES: APPROACHES TO HELPING PERSONS WITH LONG-TERM MENTAL ILLNESS 1

(1986). More recently, innovative alternatives have developed. See Wisor, supra
(describing the privatization of care for people with mental illness in Massachusetts and
evaluating the probability that the Massachusetts system will effectively meet the needs
of all people with mental illness in that state).
5. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of FOCUS on Community Understanding and
Services, Inc., et al. in Support of Respondents at 19-20, Heller (1993) (No. 92-351)
[hereinafter FOCUS] (discussing the movement of many citizens with mental retardation
out of institutions and into the community).
Psychosocial rehabilitation programs for people with mental illness have emphasized
preventing rehospitalization as well as enabling people with mental illness to become
actively involved in managing their programs. Judith A. Cook and Sara J. Hoffschmidt,
Comprehensive Models of Psychosocial Rehabilitation, in PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION
IN PRACTICE 81, 82 (Robert W. Flexer & Phyllis L. Solomon eds., 1993). For example,
Colorado designed a program comprised of six different community-based therapeutic
environments. Paul R. Polak & Michael W. Kirby, A Model to Replace Psychiatric
Hospitals, 162 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 13 (1976). Some of the components of
the program included home treatment, crisis intervention, social systems intervention,
and rapid tranquilization. Id. at 13-14.
Another well known model of community-based care, designed for adults with long-
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Most states have statutes governing involuntary commitment procedures for individuals with mental illness and mental retardation.
While both mental conditions may lead to involuntary commitment,7
many states have identified distinctions between these disabilities
which they contend are relevant to the commitment process.8 For example, mental retardation is a developmental disability which manifests
itself before adulthood. 9 By the time a child reaches the age of
majority, the existence and the extent of the disability should be well
documented. ° Mental illness, however, is more difficult to diagnose." This difficulty is partially attributable to the sudden onset of
mental illness and the delayed manifestation2 of the illness which often
appears for the first time during adulthood.'
term mental illness, utilizes varying degrees of services and supports incorporating:
"[Liocation of Clients/Outreach; assistance in meeting basic human needs; mental
health care; 24-hour crisis assistance; psychosocial and vocational services;
rehabilitative and supportive housing; assistance/consultation and education; natural
support systems; grievance procedures/protection of client rights; [and] case
management." TROUL, supra note 4, at 3-5.
Perhaps the most well-known psychosocial rehabilitation program for the long-term
mentally ill is Fountain House. John H. Beard et al., The Fountain House Model of
Psychiatric Rehabilitation, 5 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 47 (1982).
6. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646-47 (citing existing statutes on mental illness and
mental retardation from virtually every state).
7. For purposes of this Note, the term "disabilities" refers to both mental illness and
mental retardation.
8. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2645-48.
9. Id. at 2643 (referring to AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 29 (3d rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-IIIR];
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 5, 16-18 (9th ed. 1992); SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET

AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 16-17, 37 (3d ed. 1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202B.010(9) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991)).
Mental retardation is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested
during the developmental period." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.010(9) (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1991). It "results in 'deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning [such that]
the person's effectiveness in areas such as social skills, communication, and daily
living skills, and how well the person meets the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected of his or her age by his or her cultural group"' are
diminished. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2647 (quoting DSM-IIIR, supra, at 28-29).
10. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
11. Id. at 2644 (citing DSM-IIIR, supra note 9, at 190, 220, 229, where the American
Psychiatric Association reported that mental illness may manifest itself during
adulthood); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (describing the
uncertainties inherent in psychiatric diagnosis); BRAKEL, supra note 9, at 18; James W.
Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 414, 438-39 (1985) (stating that mental illness "constitutes an imprecise notion,
fraught with definitional and diagnostic fuzziness").
12. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2644. In contrast to the general definition of mental
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The constitutional implications of distinguishing between mental
retardation and mental illness in drafting involuntary commitment statutes has become a matter of concern for the Supreme Court of the
United States. In Heller v. Doe, 3 the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutional protections available to individuals with mental retardation facing involuntary commitment. 4 In Heller, the Court held that
a Kentucky statute that uses a lower burden of proof to involuntarily
commit people with mental retardation, than a similar statute used to
involuntarily commit people with mental illness, does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.' 5 In addition, the Court
ruled that Kentucky's grant of party status to the relatives and legal
guardians of adults with mental retardation for purposes of involuntary
commitment proceedings, while denying the same rights to the
relatives and legal guardians of adults with mental illness, does not
6
violate either equal protection or due process guarantees.'
This Note analyzes the constitutional and social impact of Heller v.
Doe.17 First, this Note addresses both the due process and equal protection implications of involuntarily committing individuals with
mental disabilities.' 8 Then, after tracing the battle for adequate constitutional protections for Kentucky residents with mental disabilities,' 9

retardation, the DSM-IIIR does not provide a blanket definition for mental illness. The
DSM-IIIR provides a variety of definitions and descriptions of varying types of mental
disorder, each with its own unique manifestations and treatments. Id. The DSM-IIIR is
broken down into sections covering major areas of mental disorders, the diversity of
which reveals the vast spectrum of disabilities referred to by the layperson as mental
illness. See DSM-lllR, supra note 9. Chapter three of the DSM-IIlR includes sections
addressing disorders which usually manifest during infancy, childhood, or adolescence
(pp. 27-95); those disorders identified as organic mental syndromes and disorders (pp.
95-163); psychoactive substance use disorders (pp. 165-85); schizophrenia (pp. 18798); delusional (paranoid) disorders (pp. 199-303); psychotic disorders not elsewhere
classified (pp. 205-11); mood disorders (pp. 213-33); anxiety disorders (or anxiety and
phobic neuroses) (pp. 235-53); somatoform disorders (pp. 255-77); sexual disorders
(pp. 279-96); sleep disorders (pp. 297-313); factious disorders (pp. 315-20); impulse
control disorders not elsewhere classified (pp. 321-28); adjustment disorders (pp. 32931); and psychological factors affecting physical condition (pp. 333-58). DSM-IIIR,
supra note 9.
13. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
14. Id.
15. Id.
i 6. Id. at 2647-49.
17. Id. at 2637 (1993).
18. See infra part II.A.
19. See infra parts l.B.
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this Note discusses both the majority2" and the dissenting opinions2' in
Heller.
This Note also considers the level of scrutiny applied to statutes
affecting individuals with disabilities, 22 and finds congressional support in the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") 23 for strictly
scrutinizing such statutes. 24 This Note then analyzes the legitimacy of
disparate burdens of proof for involuntary commitment statutes applicable to individuals with mental illness and mental retardation.25
Finally, this Note predicts how Heller will affect constitutional protections across the country for individuals with mental retardation who
face involuntary commitment.26
II. BACKGROUND
Early American history reveals that individuals with mental
retardation were often deprived of their constitutional rights.2 1 Consistent with societal indifference toward the rights of individuals with
mental retardation, the Supreme Court did not consider the constitutionality of any civil commitment statutes until the 1960s. Finally, at
that time, the Supreme Court began to show interest in protecting the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens confronting involuntary
commitment. 28
20. See infra part III.B.
21. See infra part III.C.
22. See infra part IV.A.
23. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (Supp. IV 1992)).
24. See infra part IV.B.
25. See infra part IV.C.
26. See infra part V.
27. See, e.g., FOCUS, supra note 5, at 5-6 (suggesting that the constitutional issues
of equal protection and due process are significant when applied to people with mental
retardation, given the historical treatment of people with mental retardation as lessthan-equal members of society).
28. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966). In Baxstrom, the
Supreme Court established that the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed a convicted
criminal the same commitment proceedings provided for all others facing civil
commitment based on mental illness. Id. The State placed Baxstrom, a convicted
criminal, in a state institution for the criminally insane during his incarceration and
denied him release or transfer following the completion of his sentence. Id. at 108-09.
Eventually, the Supreme Court determined that because all civil commitments except
those where the person is awaiting the expiration of a penal sentence, provided for a
judicial hearing on the issue of sanity, and that Baxstrom was denied this procedural
protection based on a "capricious" classification unrelated to his alleged criminal
tendencies, the state policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Id.
at 115. This case clarified that equal protection is applicable to all segments of the
population, including those people living with mental disabilities.
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Involuntary commitment of individuals with mental illness and
mental retardation raises both due process and equal protection concerns. This Part explains how, unlike non-disabled 9 citizens, citizens
with mental illnesses or mental retardation have only gradually
obtained due process and equal protection rights under the Constitution. 30 This Part also focuses on Kentucky's approach toward
involuntary conmitment prior to Heller.3'
A. The ConstitutionalImplicationsof Involuntary Commitment
During the 1970s, a growing concern for due process significantly
affected the legal system's evaluation of involuntary commitment statutes. 32 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution each
contain a due process clause which limits the government's ability to
deprive individuals of life, liberty and property without an opportunity
to be heard.33 In Addington v. Texas,34 the Supreme Court deterSee also United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961), prob.
juris. noted, 368 U.S. 951, and vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 149 (1962) (evaluating a law
allowing for the commitment of individuals who have served prison sentences without
providing for the same pre-commitment proceedings available to others).
29. For purposes of this article, the term "non-disabled" refers to people who have
neither a mental illness nor a mental retardation.
30. See infra part II.A.
31. See infra part I.B.
32. The Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), marked an
expansion in the scope of due process guarantees. Justice Brennan wrote the majority
opinion in Goldberg, holding that due process guarantees an evidentiary hearing prior to
terminating welfare benefits. 397 U.S. at 261.
A series of cases following Goldberg extended procedural due process guarantees to a
broader range of claimants. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 584-588 (12th
ed. 1991) (containing a commentary entitled The Background of the Modern Developments: The Procedural Due Process Revolution of the Early 1970s). Eventually, the
Court had to confront the potential due process issues involved with involuntary
commitment statutes. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding that
the State of Florida violated the Constitution when it involuntarily confined to a mental
institution a person who was not dangerous to himself or others). See generally RALPH
REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, ch. 6 (1985); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD

D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.4, at 498-500 (4th ed. 1991).

33. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Substantive due process, as distinguished from
procedural due process, restricts the ways in which legislatures may limit individual
freedom. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 13.1, at 487. Procedural due process
guarantees a fair procedure to determine the legality of a government action that deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property. Id.; see, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972) (providing a clear explanation of due process and its limits); JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, pt. 3, ch. 15, § 11, at 528 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. For commentary on the federal courts' interpretation of the
proper scope of these protected interests, see Robert J. Glennon, Constitutional Liberty
and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355 (1978).
34. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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mined that, at a minimum, due process requires courts to apply a clear
and convincing standard of proof when determining whether to
involuntarily commit individuals with mental illness.35 Although
Addington involved the commitment to a mental hospital, 36 it set the
stage for similar analysis of the involuntary commitment of individuals
with mental retardation. Consequently, under due process analysis,
the states were left to determine precisely what burden they would
require, as long as that burden was equal to or, greater than the clear
and convincing burden of proof.37
Similarly, equal protection becomes an issue when statutes classify
individuals according to disabilities. For example, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,38 the Supreme Court evaluated a zoning
ordinance which was allegedly discriminatory as it applied to housing
for individuals with mental retardation.39 Concluding that the Fifth
Circuit had erred in applying a quasi-suspect classification to individuals with mental retardation, the Cleburne Court applied a lesser
standard of scrutiny.4° Based on the Cleburne holding that individuals
with either mental retardation or mental illness do not merit heightened
or strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis, courts now apply the
lowest level of scrutiny in evaluating statutes which classify based on
mental illness or mental retardation.4'
35. Id. at 433. Addington argued that the trial court's use of the "unequivocal and
convincing" burden to determine that he was mentally ill and in need of commitment
violated his substantive due process rights. Id. at 421. Addington asserted that the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was more proper because it is the standard required
to deprive a criminal defendant of liberty. Id. at 421-22. Texas refused to apply the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard because the uncertainty of psychiatric diagnosis
would render commitment under this standard almost impossible. Id. at 429. The
Supreme Court determined that the differences between criminal and civil commitment
justified a slightly lower burden of proof for civil commitment. Id. at 428-29.
36. Id. at 419.
37. Id. at 433.
38. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
39. Id. at 434.
40. Id. at 435. The Court stated: "The Court of Appeals . . .held that mental
retardation is a 'quasi-suspect' classification and that the ordinance violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it did not substantially further an important governmental
purpose. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate .... " Id. See also
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231 (1981) (evading the issue of using heightened
scrutiny by determining that the statute under review did not classify directly based on
mental health); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 710-711 (3d Cir. 1979) (concluding that
people with mental illness did not constitute a suspect class); Halderman v. Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 130 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
(determining that suspect classification is inappropriate when applied to people with
mental retardation).
4 1. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 ("To withstand equal protection review, legislation
distinguishing between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a
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B. Kentucky's Approach Toward Involuntary Commitment

In Kentucky, the involuntary commitment of citizens with mental
disabilities to institutions did not become a significant legal issue until
the 1970s.42 Historically, Kentucky citizens brought their relatives
with mental disabilities to state institutions and worked with staff to
determine whether commitment was necessary. 43 The lack of due process protections inherent in these commitment procedures did not
result in legal action until 1975.
In 1975, the plaintiffs in Kendall v. True" attacked the constitutionality of two mental health statutes, forcing the Commonwealth to
evaluate its involuntary commitment statutes for the first time.45
legitimate governmental purpose."). Although the Cleburne Court claimed to apply a
rational basis standard, it really applied a heightened scrutiny test. See infra notes 157
and accompanying text.
42. This indifference was not isolated to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. There are
still some states that have not developed laws for the involuntary commitment of people
with mental retardation. These states treat all commitments of people with mental
retardation as voluntary, without considering the individual's functioning ability. See,
e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (finding a violation of due process rights
where a person with mental illness deemed to be incompetent was voluntarily admitted
to a Florida mental hospital). Many states with statutes providing for involuntary
commitment based on mental retardation continue to commit most individuals on a
voluntary basis. See Brief of The American Association on Mental Retardation, et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Heller (1993) (No. 92-351) [hereinafter
AAMR].
The recent controversy surrounding involuntary commitment relates in part to the
nationwide effort to de-institutionalize care of the disabled. De-institutionalization
began during the 1960s, accompanied by exposure of the widespread abuse of people
with mental retardation within state-run institutions. See FOCUS, supra note 5, at 19.
As more citizens with mental retardation are accommodated in community-based care
facilities, those citizens remaining in, or being committed to, state institutions
represent the most severely disabled segment of the population. AAMR, supra, at 5
(discussing the context of the case). It is disturbing that the number of adults with
mental retardation cared for in state institutions has declined, but the number of adults
with mental retardation cared for in Kentucky's state institutions has increased. FOCUS,
supra note 5, at 19; see also AAMR, supra, at 5; R. C. Scheerenberger, Public
Residential Facilities: Status and Trends, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 59 (1981).
43. See Brief for Petitioner at 31-32, Heller (1993) (No. 92-351) [hereinafter
Petitioner's Brief] ("The voluntary procedure was initiated by an application for
admission filed by the parent of a minor or the legal guardian of an adult through one of
the state's Community Mental Health Centers. The application required the Director of
the Community Mental Health Center to certify that the needs of the mentally retarded
person could not be met by services available in the community."); see also Brief for
Respondents at 8-9, Heller (1993) (No. 92-351) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief]
(describing the informal method of commitment actually used in Kentucky).
44. 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
45. Id. at 414. As quoted in Kendall, KY. REV. STAT. § 202.060 provided that:
If the petition alleges that the defendant probably will cause injury to
himself or others and that he does not have the capacity or insight to authorize
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Specifically, these claims compelled Kentucky to establish certain due
process requirements for the involuntary commitment of individuals
with mental illness. 46
his own hospitalization a warrant may be issued for his arrest. Such person if
arrested on such warrant shall be conveyed immediately to any hospital,
medical facility or institution approved by the commissioner and shall be
there examined by one or more staff physicians or psychiatrists of the
hospital or facility. If an authorized staff physician concurs that the person
probably will cause injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained
and thus should be hospitalized, such person may be retained in the hospital
pending a hearing and judgment from the appropriate court as prescribed in
KRS Chapters 202, 203 or 210, or may be transported to an appropriate state
hospital or institution, affiliated with the examining facility, for such
retention.
Id. at 415 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.060).
The Kendall court held that the foregoing statute was constitutional because it provided
for involuntary commitment only when individuals were found to pose a threat to
themselves or others. Id. at 420.
As quoted in Kendall, KY. REV. STAT. § 202.100 stated:
When a petition for a sixty-day observation order has been properly filed
with the clerk of the court, the court shall appoint two physicians to examine
the proposed patient and to certify to the court their findings as to the mental
condition of the individual and his need for observation or treatment. Where
the individual named is already a patient in a hospital by virtue of a provision
of KRS Chapters 202, 203 or 210, the court may waive the appointment of
two examining physicians, and accept as evidence of the patient's mental
condition the certification of two authorized staff physicians of the hospital
in which the patient is held. If the examining physicians certify to the effect
that the individual requires further observation or treatment, the court may
order such person to a state mental hospital or other medical facility approved
by the commissioner, or if facilities are available and if such person is
eligible for care or treatment therein, to the United States veterans
administration or other agency of the United States government for a period of
care and medical examination, observation and treatment of the mental
condition of such person for a period of time not to exceed sixty days.
Id. at 154 (quoting Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.100).
The Kendall court found this statute unconstitutional because it did not specify how
physicians and courts were to determine whether or not an individual was in need of
involuntary commitment. Id. at 418-19.
46. The Kendall court dictated the following due process requirements:
1. A right to a preliminary probable cause hearing, although this need not be
overly formal and may properly include the receiving of doctors' reports as
hearsay.
2. The right to a notice before the final hearing, setting out in some detail the
factual reasons upon which the state intends to rely in seeking the 60 day
commitment.
3. The requirement that the final hearing be held within 21 days of the date of
confinement. It is noted that the statute has no time limit in this respect.
4. The right of the patient to be present at both hearings, unless the right is
intelligently waived by himself and counsel, or unless the Court makes a
specific finding after the patient has been brought to the place of hearing that
he should be removed from the hearing because his conduct is so disruptive
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During the 1970s, the doctrine of parenspatriae,7 which Kentucky
and other states used to justify involuntary commitment, lost credibility.48 Until the Kendall decision, the Commonwealth of Kentucky
believed that adults with mental illness lacked the capacity to choose to
commit themselves and, therefore, justified committing these
individuals under parenspatriae.49 Kendall ultimately compelled Ken-

tucky to require a finding that a person was dangerous to himself or to
society before the state could involuntarily commit an adult alleged to
have a mental illness. ° Unfortunately, Kentucky mental institutions
effectively avoided the due process requirements established in
Kendall by characterizing almost all commitments of adults with
mental disabilities as voluntary. 51 Not until Kentucky faced a series of
claims brought by Plaintiff Doe 52 did Kentucky courts begin to
seriously scrutinize their approach toward involuntary commitment
again.

that the proceeding cannot continue in any reasonable manner.
Kendall, 391 F. Supp. at 419; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.026, 202A.051
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
47. Parens patriae literally means:
"parent of the country", [and] refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or
the insane ....
Parens Patriae originates from the English common law where the King had a
royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as
infants ....
The use of this power to deprive a person of freedom has been limited by recent
laws and decisions; e.g. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-555 (1966).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
48. Kendall, 391 F. Supp. at 417; see also State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d
109, 123 (W. Va. 1974).
49. Kendall, 391 F. Supp. at 417.
50. Id.; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.026, 202A.051 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1991).
5 1. Respondents' Brief, supra note 43, at 8.
52. Doe is the named plaintiff representing a class of people who have been admitted,
or who face admission, to Kentucky's institutions for people with mental retardation.
See infra part II1.A.
Plaintiff Doe was placed in the custody of the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources
in 1971. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1389 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967
(1988). The Commonwealth institutionalized him in the Outwood State Hospital,
located in Dawson Springs, Kentucky. Id. Based on the findings from a judicial hearing,
Doe was declared incompetent and his mother was appointed his legal guardian in 1977.
Id. During the entire seventeen years of Doe's confinement, there has never been an
evaluation of the appropriateness of his confinement. Id.
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III. HELLER V. DOE

A. Doe's Fightfor Due Processand Equal ProtectionRights
Initiating over ten years of litigation, Plaintiff Doe brought his first
claim in 1982." 3 This claim challenged the adequacy of both voluntary
and involuntary commitment procedures for individuals with mental
retardation in Kentucky.54 In response to Doe's action, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky invalidated
Kentucky's involuntary commitment statutes on both due process and
equal protection grounds. 55 The court held that due process guarantees
require Kentucky to provide a judicial hearing for each individual with
mental retardation facing involuntary commitment.56 The court also
held that Kentucky's involuntary commitment statutes violated equal
protection guarantees because they required such hearings prior to
commitment for individuals with mental illness and not for individuals
with mental retardation.57
On appeal, the Secretary for the Cabinet for Human Resources,
Harry J. Cowherd, M.D., contended that current administrative pro53. Doe v. Austin, 668 F. Supp. 597, 598 (W.D. Ky. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
54. Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354, 355 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (referring to Austin,
848 F.2d at 1392). At the time of the case, Harry J. Cowherd, M.D. was the Secretary for
the Cabinet for Human Resources. Id. at 354.
55. Austin, 668 F. Supp. at 600-01.
56. Id. at 600. The court recognized that commitment to an institution for people
with mental retardation might be the best alternative for some adults with mental
retardation. Id. However, the court also acknowledged that commitment to an
institution is a curtailment of personal liberty which merits due process protections. Id.
Thus, the court held that prior to involuntarily committing adults with mental
retardation, the Commonwealth must conduct a judicial hearing in order to determine that
commitment to such an institution was the best option for the individual. Id. The court
recognized that adults with mental retardation maintained rights equivalent to adults
without mental retardation rather than those rights accorded to minors. Id.
57. Id. at 600-01. It is important to note that most commitments prior to 1986 were
treated as voluntary. The statutory provisions for equal protection and due process were
ineffective in light of the realities of commitment. Austin, 848 F.2d at 1389 ("[D]uring
1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, only one mentally retarded person was admitted pursuant
to the statutory procedures for involuntary commitment.").
In 1986, amendments to the Kentucky statutes eliminated the provision of judicial
hearings prior to the involuntary commitment of adults with mental retardation. Id. at
1390. Under the revised statute, most commitments of people with mental retardation
were to be treated as voluntary under the revised Kentucky statute. Id. The Austin court
concluded that it would violate due process if Kentucky were allowed to commit people
with mental retardation, who have not yet attained the age of eighteen, without a judicial
hearing. Austin, 668 F. Supp. at 599-600. Finally, the court held that while the two
populations affected by these statutes were different, they had equivalent rights to be
protected from improper commitment. Id. at 601.
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cedures satisfied constitutional requirements.58 The Sixth Circuit,
however, upheld the district court's ruling that the denial of judicial
hearings for Kentucky's citizens with mental retardation, when
hearings were provided for individuals with mental illness, 9 deprived
individuals with mental retardation of both due process6" and equal
protection. 6' The Sixth Circuit tempered its holding by accepting that
the hearings did not have to be conducted by legally trained judicial or
administrative officers.62
Following this decision and the Supreme Court's denial of the Secretary's petition for a writ of certiorari,63 the Secretary began to
negotiate with Doe's attorneys in an attempt to bring the commitment
proceedings into compliance with the Constitution. 64 Before a plan
could be implemented, however, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted Kentucky House Bill 511 ("HB 511") which reworked the
statutory provisions for commitment of individuals with mental
58. Austin, 848 F.2d at 1393-94.
59. Prior to 1986, Kentucky state law provided that "[all rights guaranteed by K.R.S.
Chapters 202A and 210 to mentally ill persons shall apply to mentally retarded
persons." Austin, 668 F. Supp. at 598 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.050
(Baldwin 1982)). These rights included the procedural due process ight to a preliminary
hearing in a district court to determine whether to. involuntarily commit a mentally
retarded individual. Id.
As amended in 1986, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.050 provided that "[a]ll rights
guaranteed by K.R.S. Chapters 202A (other than those rights enumerated in K.R.S.
202A.026 and 202A.051) and K.R.S. Chapter 210 to mentally ill persons shall apply to
mentally retarded persons." Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.050 (Baldwin
1986)). According to the district court, "[t]he 1986 amendments (HB 477) effectively
eliminated the rights of mentally retarded persons to a judicial hearing prior to
involuntary commitment." Id.
60. The Sixth Circuit explained: "[Tlhe Commonwealth has not demonstrated that it
has any rational basis for distinguishing between the mentally ill and the mentally
retarded with regard to a judicial determination of their eligibility for civil
commitment." Austin, 848 F.2d at 1394. The Austin court cited J.R. v. Parham, 442
U.S. 584 (1979), as controlling the issue of due process for minor children with mental
retardation. Austin, 848 F.2d at 1392. The Court in Parham denied that a minor with
mental retardation had a due process fight to a judicial proceeding so long as there was an
inquiry made by a neutral fact finder as to whether the statutory requirements for
admission were met. Parham, 442 U.S. at 618-19.
6 1. Austin, 848 F.2d at 1394 ("[W]e agree with the district court that equal protection
requires the Commonwealth to provide a judicial hearing to appellees, either upon
admission, or, if now committed, when they reach adulthood.").
62. Id. ("[Dlue process does not require that the neutral trier of fact be legally trained
or a judicial or administrative officer.") (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 607; Morissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (hearing prior to termination of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") benefits)).
63. 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
64. Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
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retardation. 65 Dissatisfied with the new statutory provisions, Doe
brought a claim contending that these provisions also provided inadequate procedural protections against involuntary commitment.'
One of these new provisions required Kentucky to meet a clear and
convincing standard of proof to involuntarily commit an individual
with mental retardation.67 The Supreme Court had previously
concluded in Addington that either clear and convincing or beyond a
reasonable doubt were acceptable standards.68 Nevertheless, Doe
65. According to the district court, "Under HB 511, codified as the 1990 amendments
to K.R.S 202B, the previous incorporation by reference in K.R.S. 202B.050 to the
rights of mentally ill persons established in K.R.S. 202A was totally eliminated." Id.;
see supra note 59.
Section 4(2) of HB 511 expressly allowed, without a judicial hearing, voluntary
admission of mildly or moderately mentally retarded adults who possess "the mental
capacity to give informed consent for admission." Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 356
(quoting HB 511 § 4(2)). Nevertheless, Section 4(3) of HB 511 failed to provide for
voluntarily admitted individuals with mental retardation to be released at their own
request. Id. at 357 (quoting HB 511 § 4(3)).
66. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 359. Doe claimed that the statute's application of a
clear and convincing standard of proof for involuntary commitments of people with
mental retardation violated equal protection because a higher burden of proof was utilized
for the involuntary commitment of people with mental illness. Id. at 357-58. Finally,
Doe contended that HB 511 obstructed access to legal representation for people with
mental retardation confronted with involuntary commitment proceedings, while legal
representation for people with mental illness was automatically provided. Id. at 358-59.
Doe contended that the discrepancies between the statutory provisions for involuntary
commitment of people with mental illness and people with mental retardation amounted
to an equal protection violation. Id. The compliance agreement reached prior to
enactment of HB 511 provided for equivalent rights and procedures for commitment of
people with mental illness and mental retardation, yet the statutes enacted in Kentucky
failed to apply the protections to people with mental retardation. See Respondents'
Brief, supra note 43, at 7.
Two issues not addressed by the later Supreme Court opinion include Doe's contention
that there should be a judicial hearing even for citizens with mild retardation who elect to
voluntarily commit themselves, and Doe's observation that there were no provisions for
voluntarily committed people with mental retardation to elect to be released from an
institution. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 357. The district court denied that adults with
mild or moderate retardation were incapable of voluntarily committing themselves
without judicial proceedings to oversee the process. Id. In addition, that court agreed
that HB 511 needed to be modified to include express provisions for the release of
voluntarily committed adults upon their request. Id.
67. Id. at 357. The statute providing for involuntary commitment of people with
mental illness utilizes the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Id.
Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (stating
that "[t]he manner of proceeding and the rules of evidence shall be the same as those in
any criminal proceeding, except that the standard of proof shall be by clear and
convincing evidence") with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1991) (stating that "[t]he manner of proceeding and the rules of evidence shall be the
same as those in any criminal proceeding including the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added)).
68. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). See supra notes 34-37 and
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argued, and the district court agreed, that equal protection for
individuals with either mental illness or mental retardation required
equivalent burdens of proof for the involuntary commitment of
individuals with either disability. 69 Thus, the district court of Kentucky held that using a clear and convincing standard for committing
individuals with mental retardation, while applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in committing individuals with mental illness,
violated equal protection guarantees.70 In addition, the court held that
Kentucky's granting party status to relatives and guardians of
individuals with mental retardation, without granting such party status
in commitment proceedings
involving individuals with mental illness,
71
violated equal protection.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the ruling that a lower burden of proof for
involuntary commitment of individuals with mental retardation, as
opposed to individuals with mental illness, violated equal protection.72
In addition, it concluded that proceedings which place individual
liberty in jeopardy required the same constitutional protection provided
in criminal proceedings, namely a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.73 The Sixth Circuit also upheld the denial of party
participation by relatives and guardians of an individual facing
involuntary commitment.74
accompanying text. Relying on Addington, the Secretary contended that the Supreme
Court accepted the clear and convincing standard as a legitimate standard of proof for
civil commitments. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 358 (referring to Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
69. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 357.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit determined that
neither it nor the district court had jurisdiction to require the Commonwealth to
implement a written provision allowing adults with mental illness, who had voluntarily
committed themselves, to request release at will. Id. at I11.
73. Id. at 113 (citing Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. Ct. App.
1964)).
74. Id. The Sixth Circuit determined that allowing party participation by family and
guardians of the person facing commitment violated equal protection and due process.
Id. That court reiterated the reasoning from Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d at 1386 (6th Cir.
1986), and concluded that parents did not have the discretionary power to commit their
mentally retarded adult children. Cowherd, 965 F.2d at 113. In addition, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the interests of the parent or guardian may be adverse to that of the
person confronted with the possibility of commitment. Id. According to the court,
people with mental retardation should not have to contend against several adverse
parties in order to avoid involuntary commitment, when people with mental illness only
contend with a single opponent in commitment proceedings. Id.
The Kentucky statute at issue provides that "[g]uardians and immediate family members
of the respondent shall be allowed to attend all hearings, conferences or similar
proceedings; may be represented by private counsel, if desired; may cross-examine
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Kentucky then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States. 75 The Supreme Court granted the petition in order to
address two questions: (1) the legitimacy of the disparate burdens of
proof employed in commitment proceedings; and (2) the legitimacy of
granting party status to relatives and guardians of adults with mental
retardation during the commitment process.76
B. The Supreme Court'sMajority Opinion
In Heller v. Doe,77 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Sixth Circuit and upheld Kentucky's involuntary
commitment statutes which require a lower burden of proof to commit
individuals with mental retardation than to commit individuals with
mental illness.78 Furthermore, the Court held Kentucky's practice of
granting party status only to family members and legal guardians of
individuals with mental retardation during the commitment process
constitutional.79
Justice Kennedy began the Court's opinion80 by finding that the
rational basis test applies when evaluating the constitutionality of the
Kentucky involuntary commitment statutes. 8' The Court declined to
witnesses if desired; and shall have standing to appeal any adverse decision." KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). The Kentucky statute which
governs the involuntary commitment of individuals with mental illness has no such
provision. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
75. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992).
76. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1993). Based on the different standards of
proof required for the involuntary commitment of individuals with mental retardation as
compared to the involuntary commitment of people with mental illness, coupled with
the right of family and guardians to participate in the commitment process, Doe asserted
that the statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2643.
79. Id. at 2649.
80. Justice Kennedy was joined in his opinion by Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia,
and Thomas. Id. at 2639. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. Id.
at 2650 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority
that "allowing guardians and immediate family members to participate as parties in
commitment proceedings does not violate procedural due process." Id. at 2650
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice O'Connor also agreed with the majority that
the Court should not reach the question of whether "heightened equal protection scrutiny
should be applied to the Kentucky scheme." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
81. Id. at 2642. The Supreme Court applies at least three standards of review when
determining whether a statute will withstand an equal protection challenge. NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 14.3, at 574. These tests, often referred to as standards of
scrutiny, are the rational relationship test, the intermediate scrutiny test, and the strict
scrutiny test. Id. at 574-76. Under the rational relationship test, the question is
"whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational relationship to an end

1994]

Heller v. Doe

evaluate the statutes under heightened scrutiny, as Doe requested,
because of procedural flaws in his presentation of the request. 82 The
Court relied on precedent to substantiate its use of a rational basis
test.83

In applying the rational basis standard, the Court found that
Kentucky had provided legitimate reasons for implementing a lower
burden of proof for involuntary commitment based on mental
retardation than that required for involuntary commitment based on
mental illness.84 The Court explained that, in evaluating equal protection claims under rational basis review, courts do not question the
intelligence with which the statutes are designed.85 The Court also emphasized that disparate treatment is accepted as long as there is "any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification. 86
of government which is not prohibited by the Constitution." Id. at 574-75. A statute
will pass the intermediate scrutiny test if the Court finds that the "classification has a
'substantial relationship' to an 'important' government interest." Id. at 576. Finally,
under the strict scrutiny test, the court "will not defer to the decision of the other
branches of government but will instead independently determine the degree of
relationship which the classification bears to a constitutionally compelling end." Id. at
575.
82. Doe requested that the Kentucky statutes receive heightened scrutiny when
brought before the Supreme Court. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2642. While the Supreme Court
acknowledged that a heightened scrutiny analysis may have been appropriate, the
tardiness of the request justified its denial. Id. Prior proceedings implemented a rational
basis analysis and the majority accepted rational basis as the correct standard of
analysis. Id.
83. Id. at 2643 ("We have applied rational basis review in previous cases involving
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill."). See also Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3-4,
Heller (1993) (No. 92-351) (urging the application of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which held that the proper level of scrutiny of
state legislation which treats people with mental retardation differently than other
classes of people is not heightened scrutiny). In Cleburne, the Court stated: "To
withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally
retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."
473 U.S. at 446; see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981). In Schweiker, the
appellees asserted that the federal benefits under review should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny because the statute treated people with mental illness differently
than other benefits recipients. 450 U.S. at 230. The Court found that they had "no
occasion to reach this issue because ... this statute does not classify directly on the
basis of mental health." Id. at 231. The Court determined that a rational basis analysis
would be appropriate. Id. at 234.
84. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2643.
85. Id. Evaluation under a rational basis standard is central to the Supreme Court's
willingness to uphold the contested commitment statutes. Id. at 2642-50. Had the
Supreme Court evaluated the statutes under a higher level of scrutiny, the probability of
the statutes meeting minimum due process and equal protection requirements would have
greatly decreased. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
86. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2642 (citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S.
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To satisfy the Court's rational basis test, Kentucky offered various
defenses for its disparate treatment of individuals with mental retardation. 87 First, it explained that mental retardation is more easily
diagnosed than mental illness.88 According to Kentucky, mental
retardation is a static, permanent condition, 89 while mental illness may
manifest itself suddenly, without forewarning from past behavior. 9
Kentucky argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that since mental
illness is harder to diagnose than mental retardation, the need to avoid
erroneous commitment justifies a higher burden for individuals with
mental illness. 9' In addition, the Court also accepted Kentucky's
argument that the relative ease of determining that a person with mental
retardation poses a danger to himself or others justifies disparate
treatment.92 For these reasons, the Court concluded "it would have
been plausible for Kentucky to conclude that the dangerousness
determination was more accurate as to the mentally retarded than the
mentally ill." 93
The Court also accepted the contention that individuals with mental
retardation receive less invasive treatment than individuals with mental
illness. 94 Thus, according to the Court, the heightened burden of
Ct. 2096, 2100-01 (1993)). See also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 (1990)
(determining that a rational basis existed for distinguishing between child support
payments and government funded Title 11payments in evaluating eligibility for AFDC
benefits); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-03 (1987) (determining that a rational
basis existed for requiring that families wishing to receive AFDC benefits include within
the family unit children for whom child support payments are made); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79 (1980) (holding that under rational basis
analysis it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to draw lines between groups of
employees for the purpose of phasing out the, overlap of two different benefits
programs); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (holding that under
rational basis analysis the Maryland Department of Public Welfare has the authority to
place a limit on the amount of a grant under AFDC regardless of the size of the family or
the family's need).
87. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2643-44.
88. Id. at 2643.
89. Id. at 2644. Mental retardation is a developmental disability that manifests prior
to adulthood. Thus, by adulthood, the disability has been well documented. DSM-IIIR.
supra note 9. In contrast, mental illness can have a sudden onset and may not manifest
itself until adulthood. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2644. The Supreme Court has recognized in
previous cases that diagnosis of mental illness is very difficult. See, e.g., Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (finding that "[tihe subtleties and nuances of
psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations"); see
also BRAKEL, supra note 9, at 16-17.
90. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2644.
9 I.Id. See also GEOFFREY KEPPEL, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 65-68 (1973).
92. Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2644-45.
93. Id. at 2645.
94. Id. The Court explained: "The mentally ill are subjected to medical and
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proof for committing individuals with mental illness is justified by the
greater extent of potential intrusion through treatment.95 Interestingly,
the Court accepted that some individuals with mental retardation suffer
intrusive treatments during commitment. Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that Kentucky could plausibly believe that most individuals
with mental retardation receive less intrusive treatment during commitment than do individuals with mental illness. 96 Thus, the Court
concluded the assumption that some individuals with mental illness
receive invasive treatments justifies making it more difficult to
involuntarily commit individuals with mental illness.97
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the Kentucky involuntary commitment statutes met the traditional rational basis test.98
Because Kentucky convinced the Court that the statutes' classifications
had some relationship to its legitimate objective,99 the Court found the
disparate burdens of proof required by Kentucky's involuntary
commitment statutes constitutional.'0°
Moving to the second issue for review, the Court rejected the
challenge that the participation of family members and guardians in the
involuntary commitment process of individuals with mental retardation
violates due process.' 0 ' The Court hypothesized that Kentucky
allowed for the participation of family and guardians because they have
an intimate knowledge of how a relative or ward with mental retardation functions and behaves.'°2 The Court also reasoned that family
psychiatric treatment which may involve intrusive inquiries into the patient's
innermost thoughts and use of psychotropic drugs . .

.

. By contrast, the mentally

retarded in general are not subjected to these medical treatments." Id. (citations
omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2646.
97. See id. The Court expounded on the history of differential treatment of people
with mental retardation and mental illness in Anglo-American law. Id. at 2646 (citing I
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 481 (2d ed. 1909)). While the
historical differences in treatment did not provide immunity from criticism, the
historical precedent did help substantiate a claim that there are rational reasons for
treating these two populations differently. Id. The Court supported this contention by
observing that most of the states have separate involuntary commitment laws for the
two groups, and separate agencies for meeting the needs of these populations. Id. at
2646-47.
98. Id. at 2643.
99. See id.
100. Id. ("Kentucky has proffered more than adequate justifications for the differences
in treatment between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill."). Id.
101. Id. at 2647.
102. The Court based its hypothesis on information about mental retardation
obtained from the DSM-IIIR, supra note 9. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643.
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members could easily assess the individual's needs based on years of
experience and contact with the individual.' °3
In contrast, mental illness may not manifest itself as early as mental
retardation. °4 Therefore, family members may not have had sufficient
exposure to an individual's mental illness to provide information
useful in the commitment process. Furthermore, the Court noted,
sudden or late onset, coupled with the unpredictable nature of the
illness, renders diagnosis and treatment planning more difficult for
individuals with mental illness than for individuals with mental retardation. 05
Based upon these differences, the Court concluded that family and
guardian participation in the involuntary commitment process could
only be justified for individuals with mental retardation °6 The Court
noted that family and guardian participation decreases the risk of an
erroneous decision to deprive individuals with mental retardation of
their freedom.'0 7 While the Court admitted that Kentucky could have
developed other means by which to obtain the insights of family
members, it refused to question the means chosen by the state
legislature to address the needs of its constituents. 0 8 Thus, because
due process seeks to prevent erroneous deprivation of liberty,' °9 the
Court held that Kentucky may continue to allow family and guardians
to participate in the commitment process, because their participation
may increase the accuracy of Kentucky's decisions.

103. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2647. The stability of the impairments of people with
mental retardation are easily diagnosed compared to the severe difficulties of diagnosing
mental illness, the difficulties of which were previously documented by the court in
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979).
104. Id.
105. See id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 430).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2649.
108. Id. at 2648; cf. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981) ("As long as
the classificatory scheme .chosen by Congress rationally advances a reasonable and
identifiable governmental objective, we must disregard the existence of other methods
of allocation that we, as individuals, perhaps would have preferred.").
109. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2649 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("The function of legal process, as that
concept is embodied in the constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize
the risk of erroneous decisions.") and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972)
(stressing that due process functions to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations)).
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C. Justice Souter's DissentingOpinion
Writing in dissent, Justice Souter proposed that there was no need
to resolve the issue of heightened scrutiny because the Kentucky
involuntary commitment statutes could not even meet the rational basis
test." Thus, Justice Souter argued that the statutes were unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny."' Furthermore, he would have
applied the slightly modified rational basis analysis set out in
Cleburne' 2 to invalidate Kentucky's involuntary commitment
statutes.' 13

110. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter wrote a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Souter in part, stating that
"Kentucky's differential standard of proof for committing the mentally ill and the
mentally retarded is irrational." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). Nevertheless, she
agreed with the Court that family and guardians may participate in the process for
patients with mental retardation. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part). See supra note
80.
Although Justice Blackmun joined with Justice Souter in his dissent, Justice Blackmun
wrote separately to emphasize his conviction that the Court erred in refusing to employ
heightened scrutiny to evaluate the Kentucky statutes. Id. at 2650 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
111. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11 2. 473 U.S. at 432. Cleburne addressed the constitutionality of a zoning
regulation requiring petitioners to obtain a special use permit prior to opening a group
home for people with mental retardation. Id. at 436-37. The regulation required special
use permits prior to the construction of "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or
alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." Id. at 436. The
petitioners in Cleburne claimed the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminated against people with mental retardation.
Id. at 437. The district court applied a rational basis analysis to the statute and held it
constitutional. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, determined that people with mental
retardation constituted a quasi-suspect classification deserving intermediate level
scrutiny. Id. at 437-38. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, ultimately agreeing
with the district court and holding that people with mental retardation were not a quasisuspect class meriting heightened scrutiny. Id. at 442.
The Court recognized that the government had a legitimate interest in providing for
people with mental retardation. Id. The Court believed that any decision affecting
people with mental retardation is a technical matter appropriate for legislators who are
guided by professionals, and inappropriate for judicial oversight by an ill-informed
judiciary. Id. at 442-43. The Court also relied on recent state and federal legislation
designed to provide protection against discrimination for people with mental
retardation, interpreting this legislation as a sign that heightened scrutiny of state
legislation in this area was no longer necessary. Id. at 443-45. In addition, the Court
interpreted the legislative response as a sign of the political power possessed by people
with mental retardation, thus disqualifying them from qualifying for strict scrutiny
protection. Id.
113. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Like the Court, Justice Souter acknowledged the inherent differences between mental illness and mental retardation." 4 He,
however, questioned whether these differences justified the "particular
disparate treatment accorded under th[e] Kentucky Statute."'" 5 Justice
Souter concluded that the appropriate issue was to determine whether
some unique aspect of mental retardation justified providing less
protection against the deprivation of liberty for individuals with mental
6
retardation." 1
After reframing the issue, Justice Souter attacked the Court's interpretation that burdens of proof correlated to difficulties of proof." 7
Justice Souter proposed that the burden of proof should actually reflect8
both the difficulty and importance of avoiding erroneous decisions."
He then applied his interpretation of the purpose of burdens of proof to
the Kentucky statutes, and concluded that disparate burdens of proof
were not merited.' 9 He counterbalanced Kentucky's interests, provided for by the statute, 20 with the interests of the individual to
determine whether these different interests justified assigning a22 lower
burden of proof to commit individuals with mental retardation.

114. Id. at 2652 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting).
117. Id. at 2653 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (stating that the Court concluded that "the
demands of minimal rationality are satisfied if burdens of proof rise simply with
difficulties of proof"). The Court allowed a lesser burden of proof for involuntary
commitment of individuals with mental retardation because diagnosis of mental
retardation is less difficult than diagnosis of mental illness. Id. at 2643. Additionally,
the Court concluded that it is easier to determine the danger posed by individuals with
mental retardation than individuals with mental illness. Id. at 2644-45. See supra notes
84-93 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the Court's conclusion.
118. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter contended that
"burdens of proof are assigned and risks of error are allocated not to reflect the mere
difficulty of avoiding error, but the importance of avoiding it as judged after a thorough
consideration of those respective interests of the parties that will be affected by the
allocation." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425
(1979)).
119. Id. at 2653 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
120. According to Justice Souter, with regard to involuntary commitment, the
government has an interest in protecting society from citizens whose disability results
in a danger to society. Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425).
In addition, Justice Souter noted, the government is also responsible for protecting ill
or helpless citizens. Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting).
121. Justice Souter noted that the individual has a counterbalancing interest in
liberty and protection from the stigma associated with institutionalization. Id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26).
122. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Justice Souter ultimately argued that there was no correlation which
justified assigning different burdens of proof based on which disability
led to the commitment proceeding.' 23 Justice Souter reasoned that
involuntary commitment causes an equal loss of freedom for each
individual, regardless of whether mental retardation or mental illness
leads to commitment. 2 4 Justice Souter thus concluded that the
equivalent loss of freedom merited the equivalent burden of proof.'25
In criticizing the Court's conclusion that less invasive treatment for
individuals with mental retardation justified a lower burden of proof
for involuntary commitment, Justice Souter indicated that the Court
26
failed to propose any plausible explanation for such an assumption.1
Justice Souter then contradicted the Court's view that individuals with
mental illness receive more invasive treatment 127 by demonstrating that
mind-altering medications are also frequently prescribed for
individuals with mental retardation. 2 Therefore, the Court's analysis
of invasive treatment hardly swayed Souter from his position that
123. Id. at 2653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter observed:
Both the ill and the retarded may be dangerous, each may require care, and the
State's interest is seemingly of equal strength in each category of cases. No
one has or would argue that the value of liberty varies somehow depending on
whether one is alleged to be ill or retarded, and a mentally retarded person has
as much to lose by civil commitment to an institution as a mentally ill
counterpart ....
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (noting that "under rational basis scrutiny disparate treatment
must be justified by 'plausible reasons"')).
127. Id. at 2645 (explaining that the treatment of individuals with mental illness is
more invasive than that of individuals with mental retardation because the former
receives mind altering medication and the latter does not). For further discussion of the
Court's analysis, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 2654 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that "[olne recent
examination of institutions for the mentally retarded in Kentucky's neighboring State of
Missouri, for example, found that 76% of the institutionalized retarded receive some
type of psychoactive drug and that fully 54% receive psychotropic drugs." Id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) (citing J. Intagliata & C. Rinck, Psychoactive Drug Use in Public and
Community Residential Facilities for Mentally Retarded Persons, 21
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 268, 272-73 (1985); Hill et al., A National Study of
Prescribed Drugs in Institutions and Community Residential Facilities for Mentally
Retarded People, 21 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 279, 283 (1985) (indicating that 38
percent of the residents of institutions for people with mental retardation receive
psychotropic drugs); MICHAEL G. AMAN & NIRBHAY N. SINGH, Pharmacological
Intervention, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION 347, 348 (Johnny L. Matson &
James A. Mulick eds., 2d ed. 1991) (reporting that surveys generally reveal 30 percent
to 50 percent of residents of institutions for people with mental retardation are receiving
psychotropic drugs at any given time)).
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equivalent commitment standards must be instituted
to protect both
29
populations from unjust deprivations of liberty. 1
Justice Souter also criticized the Court's assumption that the
potential deprivation of freedom for an individual with mental illness
exceeds the potential deprivation of freedom for an individual with
mental retardation. 30 Justice Souter concluded that this observation is
not well-reasoned; he posited that a higher burden of proof, rather than
a lower burden, prior to commitment would be the logical result since
mental retardation
more frequently results in a lifetime of liberty
31
deprivation.1
Moreover, Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's opinion on
granting party status to family members and guardians of individuals
with mental retardation during the commitment process. 3 2 According
to the Court, a mentally ill person's parents may "cease[] to provide
care and support" for their child long before illness sets in,133 whereas
parents of the mentally retarded are more likely to have insights which
would aid in the involuntary commitment process. 3 4 Justice Souter
pointed out, however, that the same is not true for guardians; they
must retain the same connection to a person35with mental illness as they
would to a person with mental retardation.
Finally, Souter argued that there was no rational justification for
imposing the burden of a "second prosecutor" on the person alleged to
have mental retardation when individuals alleged to have mental illness
have no such burden. 3 6 Instead, courts should access the intimate
129. Id. at 2656 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that:
The available literature indicates that psychotropic drugs and invasive therapy
are routinely administered to the retarded as well as the mentally ill, and there
are no apparent differences of therapeutic regimes that would plausibly explain
less rigorous commitment standards for those alleged to be mentally retarded
than for those alleged to be mentally ill.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2656 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
13 1. Id. at 2656 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2647. For further discussion of the Court's analysis, see supra notes 10405 and accompanying text.
134. Id. For further discussion of the Court's analysis, see supra notes 102-03 and
accompanying text.
135. Id. at 2656 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained:
The Court simply points to no characteristic of mental retardation that could
rationally justify imposing this burden of a second prosecutor on those
alleged to be mentally retarded where that State has decided not to impose it
upon those alleged to be mentally ill. Even if we assumed a generally more
regular connection between the relatives and guardians of those alleged to be
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knowledge possessed by family members and some guardians onlyr
through their participation as witnesses in the commitment process.
Justice Souter ultimately concluded that the Court's allowance of the
differential treatment is simply an expression of the outdated stereotype
that individuals with mental retardation are "perpetual children,"
incapable of managing the responsibilities that accompany self-determination and civil rights.'38
IV. ANALYSIS

Assuming that the Supreme Court has concluded that a traditional
rational basis analysis is necessary for statutes which differentiate
between individuals with mental illness and individuals with mental
retardation, then it must, unfortunately, be conceded that the Court
resolved Heller v. Doe appropriately. Notwithstanding the Court's
conclusions, it may be argued that resolution of these issues is more
complicated than the Court's analysis suggests, as indicated by the fact
that the constitutionality of the Kentucky involuntary commitment
statutes inspired more than ten years of hostile litigation.
Three major areas of disagreement appear in the majority and
dissenting opinions which make the resolution of this case extremely
difficult. First, the Justices disagreed as to which level of scrutiny to
apply.' 3 9

Second, the Justices disagreed on the construction and

application of the rational basis test.' 4 Finally, the Justices disagreed
about the rationales underlying the burden of proof.' 4' Unfortunately,

retarded than those said to be mentally ill, it would not explain why the former
should be subject to a second prosecutor when the latter are not.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2656 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was equally dissatisfied with
the Court's determination that people with mental illness have a greater need for privacy
in the commitment process than people with mental retardation. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter's opinion raised the question of why the increased need for
privacy existing for individuals with mental illness justified placing an additional
burden of defending against a second prosecutor on the shoulders of people with mental
retardation. Id. at 2657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
139. Compare id. at 2642-43 (holding that the rational basis test applies) with id. at
2651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the test used in Cleburne should be
applied). For further analysis of these types of scrutiny, see supra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text.
140. Justice Souter supports a rational basis test which allows some investigation of
the legitimacy of the justifications offered by the state. See, e.g., id. at 2654 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Yet, the Court applied a traditional rational basis test which was
significantly more deferential to the Commonwealth. See, e.g., id. at 2643.
141. Compare id. at 2644-47 (agreeing with Kentucky that requiring disparate
burdens of proof is constitutional) with id. at 2652-56 (Souter, J., dissenting)
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the Court improperly resolved these issues.'
A. ConstitutionalAnalysis: Three Levels of Scrutiny
Although critical of the Court's use of traditional rational basis
analysis in evaluating Kentucky's involuntary commitment statutes,'43
Justice Souter's dissent stopped short of fully explaining the Court's
errors. When a state statute is challenged on the basis of equal protection, there are three levels of scrutiny available to courts in analyzing
the constitutionality of the statute.' The lowest level of scrutiny,
granting a presumption of constitutionality, tests whether the statute's
classification scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 45 The rational basis analysis, however, does not apply when a
statute classifies according to race, alienage, or national origin. 46
Laws which classify based on these categories are subject to a
second type of analysis, called strict scrutiny.'47 Under strict scrutiny,
legislation is presumed unconstitutional unless it is closely tailored to
(explaining the dissent's conclusion that there is no rational basis for requiring a lesser
burden of proof when involuntarily committing a mentally retarded individual).
142. See infra part VI.
143. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-42 (describing the three levels of judicial
scrutiny which include rational basis review, heightened scrutiny, and strict scrutiny).
See also supra note 81.
145. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,
230 (1981) (recognizing that statutes which utilize classifications will be upheld if they
are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, unless the classifications
are inherently invidious or impinge on fundamental rights); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980) (upholding. a statute which
allowed certain railroad employees to receive benefits from both the Railroad Retirement
System and Social Security, while others were restricted to receiving only Social
Security Benefits because the statute's classificatory system was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (upholding a statute
requiring Foreign Service employees to retire at the age of 60 while Civil Service
employees did not have a similar restriction placed on the age of retirement. The Court
stated that "we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different
groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational."); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-05 (1976) (applying rational basis analysis, the
Court found that a statute prohibiting New Orleans food vendors from operating in the
French Quarter unless they had been in operation for at least eight years was valid). See
generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2 to 16-5 (1978).
146. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
147. See id. (stating that statutes which classify by race, alienage, or national origin
"are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest").
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serve a compelling state interest. 48 Strict scrutiny is also applied
149
when a law limits fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.
A third level of analysis, labeled heightened scrutiny, applies where
the legislative classifications are based on gender or illegitimacy. 5 °
Heightened scrutiny, a modified version of strict scrutiny,' requires
that the legislative classifications be substantially related to a legitimate
state interest. 52 While this level of scrutiny is not as difficult for the
state to meet as strict scrutiny, it is much less deferential to the state
148. See id. ("These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others."). See generally TRIBE, supra note 145, § 16-6 (discussing general
application of strict scrutiny). The statutes which classify according to race, alienage
and national origin "are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id.; see also McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (invalidating a law which prohibited unmarried,
interracial couples from living together or spending the night in the same room);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny, the Court
evaluated a state welfare law which discriminated against aliens and a state general
assistance program which also discriminated against aliens).
149. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that in addition to statutes which classify
by race, alienage, or national origin, those which impinge on personal rights protected
by the Constitution will also receive the highest level of scrutiny); Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a statute limiting franchise in
certain school districts because the statute was not necessary to promote a compelling
state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (applying strict
scrutiny to a statute denying welfare assistance to residents who have not lived in the
state for at least one year and implicating the fundamental constitutional right to
interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding unconstitutional a judgment ordering that the defendant, a habitual criminal,
undergo a vasectomy because the judgment affected the fundamental civil right of
procreation). See generally TRIBE, supra note 145, § 16-7 (discussing inequalities
bearing on fundamental rights).
150. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 ("Legislative classifications based on gender
also call for a heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no sensible
ground for differential treatment."); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982) (explaining that gender-based classification must support important
governmental interests and be substantially related to those interests); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that a gender-based statute which prohibits the sale
of alcoholic beverages to males under the age of 18 and to females under the age of 21 did
not withstand heightened scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(stating that classifications based on gender are suspect because "the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society"). See
generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 424 (discussing alienage, gender, and
illegitimacy).
15 1. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 424.
152. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. See also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99
(1982) (holding that statutes imposing greater restrictions on support suits brought by
illegitimate children than those brought by legitimate children will survive heightened
scrutiny to the extent they substantially relate to a legitimate state interest).
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than the traditional rational basis level of scrutiny.'53
In 1984, the Supreme Court established that statutory classifications
based on mental retardation are subject to rational basis analysis.' 54 In
Heller, several states joined in submitting an amicus brief urging the
Court to apply rational basis analysis in evaluating Kentucky's statutes
affecting individuals with mental retardation.' 55 Furthermore,
although the dissenters favored applying heightened scrutiny, they
agreed that the procedural posture of Heller mandated applying the
Cleburne rational basis
56 analysis to evaluate Kentucky's involuntary
commitment statutes.
At first glance, it is unclear how both the majority and the dissent in
Heller could support use of the rational basis test, and yet disagree so
intensely about whether Kentucky's statutes infringe on the fundamental rights of individuals with mental retardation. A close reading
of the Supreme Court's decision in Cleburne, however, clarifies this
apparent contradiction. Although the Court in Cleburne claimed to
utilize a rational basis test, in actuality, the Court's reasoning
resembled a heightened scrutiny analysis.' 57
In Heller, Justice Souter's dissent understood the Cleburne rational
basis test to be more stringent than the so-called rational basis test
performed by the Court.'58 Thus, in accepting the Cleburne test
Justice Souter did not contradict his assertion that the Court erred in
conducting a traditional rational basis analysis. In supporting a height153.

NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 14.3, at 576.

154. The Court in Cleburne concluded that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect
classification and thus statutes affecting people with mental retardation are
appropriately evaluated under a rational basis analysis. 473 U.S. at 442.
155. Brief for the States of New Jersey, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Heler (1993) (No. 92-351).
156. Justice Blackmun stated in his brief but pointed dissent, that "laws that
discriminate against individuals with mental retardation, or infringe upon fundamental
rights, are subject to heightened review." Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2650 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
157. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds
the ordinance invalid on rational basis grounds and disclaims that anything special, in
the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place. Yet Cleburne's ordinance surely would
be valid under the traditional rational basis test applicable to economic and commercial
regulation.").
The Cleburne Court actually evaluated every explanation for the allegedly
discriminatory zoning ordinance offered by the City Council, and determined that none
of the explanations was sufficient to withstand a rational basis evaluation. Id. at 44850. Justice Marshall pointed to the Court's statement that the record did not factually
support the rationality of the zoning ordinance and noted that traditional rational basis
analysis does not require factual support for policy decisions. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
158. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ened scrutiny analysis of the Kentucky statutes, the dissenting Justices
simply advocated that the Court apply the same rational basis analysis
that it utilized in Cleburne.'59
Nevertheless, by applying a more traditional rational basis analysis
than that used in Cleburne, the Heller Court implied that it no longer
approved of the Cleburne Court's analysis. Moreover, until the Court
clarifies its interpretation of Cleburne's rational basis analysis, the
debate about heightened scrutiny and rational basis analysis for statutes
affecting individuals with mental retardation will continue.
B. The ProperLevel of Scrutiny Under The ADA
This debate is further complicated by Congress' passage of the
ADA.60 In Heller, the Supreme Court avoided the ADA's suggestion
of how to scrutinize statutes affecting disabled populations.' 6 , The
Respondents' Brief, however, pinpointed congressional approval in
the ADA for applying heightened scrutiny to statutes
which impinge
62
1
disabilities.
with
individuals
of
rights
the
upon
159. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Cleburne was the most recent instance in which we
addressed a classification on the basis of mental disability. . . . While the Court cites
Cleburne once, and does not purport to overrule it, neither does the Court apply it, and at
the end of the day Cleburne's status is uncertain.").
160. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (Supp. IV 1992)).
161. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642. It is within the Supreme Court's discretion to
address a "plain error" which, although not properly raised by counsel, may seriously
affect the judicial proceedings. Sup. Ct. R. 24.1.(a). At trial, neither party addressed
the level of scrutiny to be applied, and the Supreme Court refused to use its discretion to
determine whether the proper level was applied. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642 (indicating
that the "claim is not properly presented").
162. Respondents' Brief, supra note 43, at 28-29. Congress' intent in enacting the
ADA was to allow strict scrutiny of classifications that burden people with disabilities.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. IV 1992)). Respondents' Brief pointed to the
congressional findings and purposes provision of the ADA as evidence that people with
disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority," thus warranting treatment as a protected
class. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (setting forth the
congressional findings). Respondents' Brief pointed to the findings and purposes
provisions of the ADA to demonstrate that Congress had identified aspects of disability
which allowed for treatment of people with disabilities as a protected class.
Respondents' Brief, supra note 43, at 28-29.
Recently the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio noted that
Congress, through the ADA, approved the use of strict scrutiny in evaluating legislation
classifying individuals on the basis of disabilities, including mental retardation. Martin
v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993). While some object to
congressional rejection of the Supreme Court's decision to apply a less stringent
evaluation of equal protection and due process claims submitted by people with mental
retardation, the district court noted that Congress is far better equipped than the courts to
determine whether people with mental retardation require additional protection in the
form of strict or heightened scrutiny of equal protection and due process claims. Id. at
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In the findings and purposes section of the ADA, Congress implied
that it favors applying strict scrutiny to state action affecting the
disabled.'63 The findings explain that the disabled populations have
historically encountered discrimination and that individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority with little political power."
These exact factors are often used in assessing whether or not a
category of individuals should be treated as a suspect class qualifying
for strict scrutiny. 6 Thus, in accord with the ADA, Doe asserted that
individuals with disabilities, including individuals with mental retardation, are a suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny of any statute
which appears to discriminate against them."6
In failing to consider the legislative intent of the ADA, the Supreme
Court has shied away from an opportunity to demonstrate its support
of Congress' efforts to provide protection for the rights of individuals
with disabilities. The Court's hesitancy to clarify how the ADA
impacts the judicial evaluation of legislation could lead cynical
observers to question whether the Supreme Court approves of this
legislation. After Heller, optimists can only hope that the Supreme
Court will acknowledge Congress' message in the ADA to apply strict
scrutiny to statutes affecting Americans with disabilities in the future.

1209.
163. Respondents' Brief, supra note 43, at 23-24. The brief explained:
Although this Court has previously held that one sub-group of Americans with
disabilities-individuals with mental retardation-do not constitute even a
quasi-suspect class Congress, in enacting the ADA, has indicated that all
individuals with disabilities, including individuals with mental retardation,
should be treated as a suspect class.
Id. at 29 n.15 (citation omitted). See also Martin, 840 F. Supp. at 1209 (recognizing
Congress' clear intent to have classifications based on disabilities such as mental
retardation evaluated under strict scrutiny).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. IV 1992).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (delineating the basis upon which a group receives heightened judicial scrutiny
for purposes of enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Respondents'
Brief, supra note 43, at 29-30 (explaining the connection between the Court's analysis
in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. and the purpose and findings section of the
ADA).
166. Respondents' Brief, supra note 43, at 29-30. "Disability" is defined by the
ADA to include mental impairments. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). "The
legislative history of the ADA makes it clear that mental retardation is included among
mental impairments Congress intended to be covered by the enactment." (citing H.R.
REP. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990), H.R. REP. No. 485 (III), 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990), S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1989)).
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C. The Burden of Proof
In addition to applying an improper level of scrutiny, the Heller
Court approved the Kentucky involuntary commitment statutes based
on an incomplete understanding of the purposes served by the burden
of proof. 167 The Supreme Court in Addington made the critical
observation that burdens of proof serve two functions: First, the burden of proof allocates the risk of an erroneous judgment between the
opposing parties; and second, the burden of proof correlates directly to
the value society places on the individual liberty at risk."
In allowing a lesser burden of proof for the loss of liberty suffered
by individuals with mental retardation, the Supreme Court sent a clear
but disturbing message that the liberty of individuals with mental
retardation is less valuable than the liberty of individuals with mental
illness. In reaching this conclusion, the Court overstepped its discretionary authority, for even this country's highest court cannot make
value judgments about whose freedom is sufficiently important to
merit full due process protection, or alternatively, whose freedom is
sufficiently unimportant to justify denial of full due process protection.
It is distressing that the Supreme Court-the Court that is charged with
ensuring that all citizens enjoy the full and equal protection of the
Constitution-has placed the liberty interests of one group of citizens
below the liberty interests of another group.
D. Relatives and Guardiansas Partiesto the
Commitment Process
Finally, neither the Court nor Justice Souter's dissent adequately
acknowledged the medical aspects of the commitment decision. In
determining whether to commit an individual alleged to have mental
illness, medical professionals have been deemed best equipped to
determine whether the person can benefit from institutionalization.' 69
167. The Court concluded that the burden of proof was directly related to the risk of
error faced by the defendant. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2644; see also supra notes 87-97
and accompanying text. In contrast, Justice Souter's dissent argued that the burden of
proof issue was more complex. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2653-54 (Souter, J. dissenting)
(discussing the rationale for the burden of proof); see also supra notes 117-131 and
accompanying text.
168. 441 U.S. at 423. The Supreme Court in Addington made the interesting
observation that debate over the burden of proof may be of purely academic interest
because the lay juror may not differentiate between the different burdens to the same
extent as a judge does. ladat 423-25.
169. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) ("Here, the questions are
essentially medical in character: whether the child is mentally or emotionally ill and
whether he can benefit from the treatment that is provided by the state."); Addington,
441 U.S. at 429 (maintaining that whether a person has mental illness "turns on the
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It is logical to conclude, therefore, that the involuntary commitment of
individuals with mental retardation should also rest on a medical
decision, and that parental participation in the commitment process is
highly inappropriate. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
courts have traditionally deferred to professional judgment in committing individuals
with mental retardation as well as individuals with
70
mental illness.
In allowing the family members of an adult with mental retardation
to participate as parties in the commitment hearing, the Court inappropriately relied on Parhamv. J.R., a case allowing family participation
in the commitment of minors. 7 ' Mental retardation is a medical
condition and thus should not deprive one of the rights which
accompany adulthood. 72 Thus, while parental participation is appropriate in the case of a minor child, such participation essentially
trammels the rights of an adult with mental retardation. Admittedly, an
adjudicator determining the propriety of commitment would benefit
from information available from family members who are familiar with
the needs of their relative.173 Nevertheless, there are alternative means
of obtaining such information without infringing upon an adult's right
to due process-the inevitable result
of affording party participation to
74
family members and guardians.

meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and
psychologists").
170. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (emphasizing that
the courts should defer to the judgment of qualified professionals); Parham, 442 U.S. at
608 n.16 (limiting judicial review of decisions made by medical professionals).
171. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2648-49 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03).
172. AAMR, supra note 42, at 10, 21-22. See also Doe v. Austin, 668 F. Supp. 597,
599-600 (W.D. Ky. 2986) (establishing that adults with mental retardation have rights
equivalent to those of non-disabled adults (citing Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684
(M.D. Pa. 1985)); BURTON BLATT, THE CONQUEST OF MENTAL RETARDATION 832 (1987).
Case law has also substantiated the claim that every citizen has a fundamental right to
physical freedom. See AAMR, supra note 42, at 10 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.
Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (evaluating
a statute which allowed the detention of certain arrestees for safety reasons, the Court
emphasized the importance and fundamental nature of the liberty interest at stake)).
173. See Heller, 113 S.Ct. at 2656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. AAMR, supra note 42, at 23-24. The AAMR's Brief points out that familial
participation is "more analogous to rules concerning intervention of right in civil
litigation. Such intervention is limited to those with separate interests at stake that are
not adequately protected by the existing parties." Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), which addresses intervention of right,
parents cannot be given a stake in a commitment hearing involving their children
because the parents themselves are not confronting a loss of liberty.
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V.

IMPACT

Kentucky is the only state which provides a reasonable doubt
standard of proof to involuntarily commit individuals with mental
illness and the clear and convincing standard of proof to involuntarily
commit individuals with mental retardation.17 5 In 1979, fourteen states
utilized the reasonable doubt standard in the commitment of mentally ill
adults. 176 Ten of those states have since changed their statutory
provisions to require the lower clear and convincing standard. 177 Two
of the fourteen states now use a mixed standard. 7 8 Thus, the
Supreme Court's ruling that Kentucky could maintain a higher burden
of proof to commit individuals with mental illness than to commit
individuals with mental retardation 79will not directly alter the
commitment procedures of other states. 1
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision to allow Kentucky to
treat individuals with mental retardation and mental illness differently,
Kentucky citizens are now left with the seemingly hopeless task of
lobbying their state representatives to gain equal protection and due
process protection for individuals with mental illness and individuals

175. Brief of the Mental Health Law Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12, Heller (1993) (No. 92-35 1) [hereinafter MHLP].
176. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 n.5 (1979).
177. MHLP, supra note 175, at 12-13 (citing IDAHO CODE § 66-329(k) (Supp.
1992); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. §59-2917(0 (Vernon Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
253B.18 (West Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15 (West Supp. 1992); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-401 (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130 (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-12-234(10) (Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(e) (West 1987); In re
Sanbom, 545 A.2d 726 (N.H. 1988); In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (D.C. 1979)).
178.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 334-60.2, 334-60.5(i) (1985 & Supp. 1991).

Hawaii requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has mental illness, but
only clear and convincing evidence of the person's danger to himself or herself and to
others and the absence of alternative, less restrictive treatment options. Id. Montana
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for physical facts and evidence and proof to a
reasonable medical certainty for mental disorders, and proof by clear and convincing
evidence for other matters related to the commitment of people with mental illness. See
MHLP, supra note 175, at 13 n.9 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (1991)).
However, in Montana, committing people with mental retardation requires a
recommendation by a residential facility screening team coupled with an opportunity for
a judicial hearing. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-20-121, 53-20-125, 53-20-133
(1991)).
179. MHLP, supra note 175, at 13 n.9. In addition, the potential mootness of the
issue of involuntary commitment of people with mental retardation is illustrated by New
Hampshire, where all the state-run institutions providing care for people with mental
retardation have been shut down. See AAMR, supra note 42, at 6 (discussing the closing
of New Hampshire's state-run institutions and proclaiming that several other states are
scheduled to do the same in the next few years). See also A Wise Plan for the Mentally
Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1993, at A14.
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with mental retardation. 80° When the Supreme Court legitimizes statutes which perpetuate discrimination against a disabled population, it is
the responsibility of the citizens of each state to have their congressional representatives initiate legislation that will protect the disabled
against discrimination.
The Heller decision certainly has disturbing implications for the
future protection of the rights of the disabled. Nevertheless, there is
one consideration which renders this opinion slightly less threatening.
In light of Congress' enactment of the ADA, courts addressing equal
protection and due process claims brought by disabled Americans
might successfully avoid Heller by following Congress' indication to
apply strict scrutiny in evaluating such claims.18' While the Supreme
Court may have elected not to comment on the ADA, not all courts will
ignore the message sent by Congress that Americans with disabilities
have the same constitutionally guaranteed rights as non-disabled
Americans, and that these rights must be acknowledged.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Heller v. Doe, the Supreme Court effectively denied individuals
with mental retardation protection against discriminatory legislation.
The Court elected to uphold Kentucky's involuntary commitment
statutes which provide for a lower burden of proof for the commitment
of individuals with mental retardation than for individuals with mental
illness. The Supreme Court also determined that Kentucky may allow
relatives and guardians of individuals with mental retardation to
participate as parties to the commitment proceedings, while denying
the same right to the relatives and guardians of individuals with mental
illness. The Heller decision resulted in part from the Court's refusal to
apply strict scrutiny or even a heightened rational basis analysis that
has been used in the recent past. Consequently, individuals with mental retardation living in Kentucky, and their advocates, are once again
left to confront the daunting task of lobbying their state representatives
to change Kentucky's involuntary commitment statutes.
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180. This task seems hopeless because the lobby supporting the rights of people
with mental retardation has already engaged in more than ten years of powerful and
unsuccessful action to change the Kentucky involuntary commitment statutes. See supra
notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
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MHLP, supra note 175, at 14 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (suggesting that courts tend to turn first to congressional
legislation in determining the legality of an act, thus avoiding constitutional
questions)).

